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THE GLASS EELING: MAINE’S GLASS EEL AND 
ELVER REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON 
MAINE’S NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES 
Joseph O. Gribbin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, elvers and glass eels were not commercially popular 
aquatic creatures.1 However, a tsunami and European ban depleted Asian 
supplies, which rapidly increased the demand for American elvers and 
glass eels.2 The increased demand for elvers has driven their price from 
hundreds of dollars to thousands of dollars per pound.3 This increased 
profit margin has caused many additional individuals to begin fishing for 
elvers in states in which elvers are numerous and widespread, including 
Maine.4 The initial increase in elver fishing began in 2012. By 2013, the 
impact of the increased fishing began to produce adverse effects on the 
Maine elver fishery.5 Because of these effects, the state legislature passed 
emergency, sweeping legislation in early 2013, days before the elver 
season was scheduled to begin.6 Although this legislation, and the 
regulations established thereunder, are applicable to all individuals 
                                                     
 * J.D., University of Maine School of Law.  
 1. See Bill Trotter, Passamaquoddy Tribe Issues 236 Elver Licenses as Prices Top 
$2,000 Per Pound, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 9, 2012), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2012/05/09/business/passamaquoddy-tribe-issues-225-
elver-licenses-as-prices-top-2000-per-pound/ [hereinafter Trotter, Passamaquoddy Tribe 
Issues 236 Elver Licenses]. 
 2. Abby Goodnough, Netting Tiny Eels and Big Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/us/in-maine-fishing-for-tiny-eels-and-big-
profits.html?_r=1&. 
 3. Trotter, Passamaquoddy Tribe Issues 236 Elver Licenses, supra note 1.  
 4. Goodnough, supra note 2.  
 5. Bill Trotter, Maine Agrees to Reduce Lucrative Elver Landings, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/10/31/business/maine-to-
reduce-lucrative-elver-landings/ [hereinafter Trotter, Reduce Lucrative Elver Landings]. 
 6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A, amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 8, § 1 
(emergency, effective March 21, 2013). 
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harvesting elvers within Maine, the laws and regulations have had 
several unfavorable effects on Maine Indian tribal members.7 These 
effects are based on confusion regarding the applicability of laws that 
establish certain rights of the Maine Indian tribes, bands, or nations, and 
their relationship with the sweeping elver laws established in 2013. This 
Comment discusses the relationship between the State of Maine and 
Maine’s Native American tribes, and the intersection between the 
conversation of Native American heritage and the State’s interest in 
environmental protection. Part II discusses the lifecycle of the American 
eel and what distinguishes glass eels and elvers from the eel’s other life 
stages. Part III considers the recent increases in the popularity and value 
of elvers and glass eels. Part IV examines the peculiar rights of Maine’s 
Native American tribes and nations, and the process by which those 
rights were created. Part V reviews the recent changes in elver 
regulations that occurred in Maine and along the Atlantic Coast. Part VI 
discusses the ways in which Maine’s tribes have been impacted by the 
new regulations. Finally, Part VII determines whether the tribes and 
nations are excluded from the new regulations by determining whether 
they retained sovereignty over particular natural resources.  
II. THE LIFECYCLE OF THE AMERICAN EEL 
The American eel (Anguilla rostrata) undergoes numerous lifecycle 
changes throughout its life.8 Although used interchangeably, elvers and 
glass eels are terms used to describe two distinct life stages of the 
American eel.9 There are a total of six life stages of an American eel, 
including: egg, leptocephali (larvae), glass eels, elver, yellow eels, and 
silver eels.10 American eels die after only spawning once.11  
Throughout their lives, American eels move through a diverse 
variety of aquatic ecosystems. American eel spawning occurs in winter 
and early spring in the Sargasso Sea, located south of Bermuda and east 
                                                     
 7. Abigail Curtis, Two Men Found Guilty of Criminal Elver Fishing, Sentenced to 
Pay $4,250, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013), https://bangordailynews.com 
/2013/08/13/news/midcoast/two-men-found-guilty-of-criminal-elver-fishing-fined-4250/ 
[hereinafter Curtis, Men Found Guilty of Criminal Elver Fishing]. 
 8. See ATL. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM’N, INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
PLAN FOR AMERICAN EEL 6-10 (2000), available at 
http://www.asmfc.org/uploads/file/amEelFMP.pdf [hereinafter INTERSTATE FISHERY 
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AMERICAN EEL]. 
 9. See id. at 7-8.  
 10. Id. at 6-10. 
 11. Id. at 5.  
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of the Bahamas.12 The term glass eels refers to when the eels are in the 
life stage that occurs subsequent to the larvae metamorphosis, occurring 
in the Atlantic Ocean, over the continental shelf, between six to twelve 
months after hatching.13 Glass eels weigh less than their larval 
counterparts, and “are transparent, with elongated, cylindrical bodies and 
usually range in length from 48 to 65 mm.”14  
Glass eels attempt to move toward land, and are deemed elvers at the 
the point at which they ascend into fresh water and gain pigment, 
typically a brownish color; however, the pigment is not usually 
dependent on the size.15 Elvers are generally larger than glass eels, 
ordinarily four inches or larger, with the largest elvers found in the 
northern Atlantic states.16 The size differential between elvers in southern 
and northern Atlantic states correlates with northern elvers having a 
slower developmental period, allowing them to grow larger, a process 
taking nearly a year.17 Elvers are nocturnal creatures that burrow during 
the day.18 During the latter part of their elver stage, between May and 
October, American eels migrate upstream, where they first 
metamorphose to yellow eels, and eventually mature into silver eels.19 
American eels are able to absorb oxygen through both their skin and 
gills.20 This ability allows the eels to move along land, especially in areas 
of extreme saturation, such as a mud or wet grass.21 Despite the larger 
size of yellow and silver eels, only elvers and glass eels garner high sale 
prices.22 
                                                     
 12. Id. at xii; see also The Sargasso Sea, located entirely within the Atlantic Ocean, is 
the only sea without a land boundary, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/sargassosea.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). 
 13. INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AMERICAN EEL, supra note 8, at xi.  
 14. Id. at 7.   
 15. Id. at 8.  
 16. Id. at 8; U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., AMERICAN EEL 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/northeast/newsroom/pdf/Americaneel9.26.11.2.pdf. 
 17. ATL. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM’N, AMERICAN EEL BENCHMARK 
ASSESSMENT: AMERICAN EEL STOCK ASSESSMENT PEER REVIEW 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.asmfc.org/uploads/file/americanEelBenchmarkStockAssessmentReport_May
2012.pdf [hereinafter AMERICAN EEL STOCK ASSESSMENT PEER REVIEW].  
 18. INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AMERICAN EEL, supra note 8, at 12.  
 19. Id. at 8. 
 20. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 16.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Trotter, Passamaquoddy Tribe Issues 236 Elver Licenses, supra note 1.  
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III. THE INCREASED POPULARITY AND DECREASING PRESENCE OF 
AMERICAN EELS 
Elvers are popular in eastern Asian countries, such as Japan and 
South Korea,23 where they are used primarily for food.24 Domestically, 
elvers are primarily used for bait, while occasionally being found on 
high-end restaurants’ menus.25 Additionally, there are some Native 
American tribes that consume them, including the Passamaquoddy Tribe 
and Penobscot Nation.26  
The increase in demand for American eels has been brought on by a 
variety of factors. A European ban on eel fishing and an Asian tsunami 
have led to the depletion of the traditional elver and glass eel supplies 
available to the Asian market.27 Maine and South Carolina are the only 
two Atlantic states that allow for the harvesting of juvenile American 
eels, making it a lucrative business for those individuals who have the 
legal ability to harvest and sell the eels.28 A pound of elvers, on average, 
sells for around $2,000.29 Individuals can make between $30,000 and 
$40,000 in one night harvesting elvers and glass eels.30 The increased 
demand and dwindling numbers of the American eel have caused the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to investigate potential federal 
protection of the American eel under the Endangered Species Act,31 
similar to action taken by the Committee on the Status of Endangered 
Wildlife, a Canadian wildlife agency, which declared the American eel 
“a species of special concern.”32  
In addition to the increasing popularity of elvers and glass eels, the 
natural habitat of the American eel is being threatened by a variety of 
                                                     
 23. Goodnough, supra note 2. 
 24. AMERICAN EEL STOCK ASSESSMENT PEER REVIEW, supra note 17, at iv. 
 25. Id.; Goodnough, supra note 2 (describing how the rise in price has caused some 
restaurants to remove elver dishes from their menus). 
 26. AMERICAN EEL STOCK ASSESSMENT PEER REVIEW, supra note 17, at iv.  
 27. Goodnough, supra note 2.  
 28. Judy Harrison, Passamaquoddys: Catch Quota Better Way to Protect Elver Than 
Fishing License Limit, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 31, 2013), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/03/31/news/down-east/passamaquoddys-to-hold-press-
conference-on-elver-fishing-controversy/?ref=inline. 
 29. Goodnough, supra note 2.  
 30. Id. 
 31. 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List the American Eel as Threatened, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 60,431 (Sept. 29, 2011). 
 32. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 16, at 2; see Species at Risk Registry: 
American eel, CANADIAN WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/species 
/speciesDetails_e.cfm?sid=891 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
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factors unrelated to human consumption or sale. Dams and other 
waterway-obstructing structures prevent elvers and yellow eels from 
moving upstream in order to mature.33 Additionally, parasites foreign to 
the American eel habitat have begun to infest the swim bladders of 
American eels, an organ used for buoyancy.34 This infestation has the 
potential to kill the eels by shutting down this vital organ.35 Additionally, 
because of the slow maturation process of the American eel, these 
hazards can have a substantial negative impact on the long-term viability 
of certain eel populations.36 
IV. THE HISTORY AND RIGHTS OF MAINE’S NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES 
There are four federally recognized Native American groups37 that 
inhabit Maine; they are the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, 
the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, and the Aroostook Band of 
Micmacs.38 Agreements between the tribes and governmental entities 
date back to the eighteenth century, when the Passamaquoddy Tribe 
                                                     
 33. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 16, at 2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. The appropriate name by which to refer to the different groups and members of 
the Maine Native American tribes is unsettled. Courts have used various terms to refer to 
each subsection of the wider cultural group. See, e.g., Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 44 
(1st Cir. 2007) (“[N]on-Indian facilities”) (emphasis added); Penobscot Nation v. 
Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 710 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[M]any tribal members but only one non-
tribal member.”) (emphasis added); id. at 712 (“[I]ndian courts”) (emphasis added); 
United States v. Newell, 658 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A] federally recognized Indian 
tribe.”) (emphasis added); Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 9, 
770 A.2d 574 (using the term “the Tribes” to described the Penobscot Nation and 
Passamaquoddy Tribe). This Comment uses the following terms interchangeably: Native 
American(s), Indian(s), and member(s) to describe individuals within each larger socio-
cultural grouping, and tribe(s), nation(s), and band(s) to describe the largest grouping of 
each socio-cultural subset.  
 38. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6202 (2005); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., 
Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 
55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 826 (2004). The Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe are 
often collectively referred to as the “Southern Tribes.” Johnson, 498 F.3d at 39; Christine 
Malumphy & Randall Yates, Muddying Tribal Waters: Maine v. Johnson, Internal Tribal 
Affairs, and Point Source Discharge Permitting in Indian Country, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
263, 263 (2008).  
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reached initial accord with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
concerning the Passamaquoddy’s tribal land.39  
A. Historical Interaction Between the Native Americans and Early 
American Government 
The Penobscot Nation has traditionally inhabited a wide swath of 
land, covering over five million acres, encompassing the entire 
Penobscot watershed.40 The Nation had developed a system of 
conservation and environmental regulation.41 The Nation’s land was 
divided amongst Indian families, and each family was allowed to hunt 
and fish only within their land.42 In addition, the Nation’s members only 
hunted beavers every three years, and only captured and killed two-thirds 
of the beaver population, in order to allow for regeneration of the supply 
in the interim.43 Further, despite high bounties for the scalps of Nation 
members during times of war, the Nation “more than held [its] own in 
the skirmishes that ensued” against both colonial and British forces.44  
Eventually, the Nation allied with the colonial assault against Great 
Britain.45 This assistance was rewarded when the Massachusetts 
government banned trespass or waste deposit on lands claimed by the 
Nation.46 In 1790, Congress enacted the Non-Intercourse Act (NIA), 
which, among other constraints, “required that any land transfer from 
Indians of Indian Tribes be approved by the United States Congress.”47 
However, the Massachusetts government, without Congressional 
approval, slowly began to take away, barter for, or buy portions of that 
land, until little was left of the Nation’s land, save for a few islands in the 
Penobscot River, north of Bangor.48 It was not until the 1970s that the 
                                                     
 39. Cassandra Barnum, A Single Penny, an Inch of Land, or an Ounce of Sovereignty: 
The Problem of Tribal Sovereignty and Water Quality Regulation under the Maine Indian 
Claims Settlement Act, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1159, 1165 (2010).  
 40. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 827.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. (stating that it was actually the English settlers who came and began 
excessively killing the wildlife within the Penobscot lands). 
 44. Id. (claiming that the bounties were as much as forty pounds for the head of a 
male over the age of twelve). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 827-28.  
 47. Whitney Austin Walstad, Note, Maine v. Johnson: A Step in the Wrong Direction 
for the Tribal Sovereignty of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, 32 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 489 (2008). 
 48. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 828. 
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Southern Tribes discovered that the land had been improperly taken 
nearly two hundred years before.49 
B. Tension Between the Tribes and Federal and State Government 
The discovery of documents that led to the determination that the 
lands had been improperly taken has been described as a “contemporary 
Indian fairy tale.”50 The original discovery occurred when an attorney 
stumbled upon the NIA and refused to allow the well-established Indian 
claims lawyers to profit from the discovery.51 A majority of the land area 
of the State of Maine was involved in the litigation that followed the 
discovery of the NIA.52  
The Passamaquoddy asked that the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
initiate proceedings that would require the State of Maine to return the 
ill-gotten lands to the appropriate tribe or nation.53 When no action was 
taken, a lawsuit was filed which required the Secretary of the Interior to 
bring a lawsuit “by the United States to protect the Maine tribes from a 
soon-to-expire statute of limitations on their claim.”54 Because the NIA 
was explicit in its language, a United States District Court judge issued 
the court order.55 Pursuant to the order, the DOJ filed multiple lawsuits 
on behalf of both the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes, seeking 
recovery of their lands, many of which concluded in favor of the tribes.56 
Following a Department of Interior (DOI) report, one DOJ official said 
that the Tribes’ NIA lawsuits could “potentially be the most complex 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 830. 
 50. Id. at 829. 
 51. Id. at 829-30 (stating that the attorney, Tom Tureen, wanted to see that the lands 
were returned to their respective owners, rather than to solely allow the Indian claims 
lawyers to make money from the plight of the tribal members).   
 52. Id. at 830. 
 53. Id.; see also PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE, 
PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND 87-88 (1985).  
 54. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 830. The tribes claimed, and courts agreed, that the 
NIA created a trust relationship between the tribes and the United States. Joint Council of 
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649, 660-61 (D. Me. 1975). 
 55. See Rodgers, supra note 38, at 830; BRODEUR, supra note 52, at 93. 
 56. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 830. One court determined, while issuing a declaratory 
judgment, that the NIA was not ambiguous and that the literal meaning of the NIA was to 
be applied to all Indian tribes, regardless of the fact that they were or were not a federally 
recognized tribe. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 656. The same court also determined that the 
purpose of the law was to protect Indian lands because of a fear of “fraud and 
unfairness.” Id.; see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 
119 (1960). 
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litigation ever brought in federal courts,”57 as the lawsuit risked the 
possibility of forcing hundreds of thousands of individuals and numerous 
large businesses from the lands in question.58 
The possibility of loss for thousands of Mainers made the lawsuits a 
political issue for many individuals running for office in Maine. In fact, 
many Maine politicians in the late 1970s built a campaign around the 
issue, often using the phrase “not ‘an inch of land or a single penny’” to 
show that they were not willing to cede any portion of Maine, either 
physical or financial, to the tribes.59 These politicians included both the 
sitting governor and William Cohen, who would later become a United 
States senator.60 Then-Attorney General Joseph Brennan expressed 
concern that allowing the Indians to regulate their own land would lead 
to overfishing and overhunting, which would affect the ability of non-
tribal members to perform the same activities, because of a decrease in 
wildlife populations.61 
The Carter administration made the first to attempt to settle with the 
Indians.62 Based on factors, including politics, law, and jealousy, 
settlement eventually occurred.63 The Penobscot Nation, Passamaquoddy 
Tribe, and the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians reached an agreement 
with both Maine and the federal government regarding their property, 
governance, and similar rights.64 The agreements had both positive and 
negative outcomes for the tribes. They “obtained federal recognition . . . 
and received almost . . . $81.5 million,” while extinguishing all of their 
prior claims.65 The Tribes’ “right to self governance was preserved to a 
limited extent,”66 but Maine retained the ability to regulate the tribes “to 
                                                     
 57. BRODEUR, supra note 53, at 99.  
 58. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 830. 
 59. Id. at 831. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Douglas Luckerman, The Role of Jurisdiction in the quest for Sovereignty: 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Environmental Primacy on Tribal Lands, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 635, 640 (2003) (expressing that Brennan was concerned that without regulation, 
the Indian tribes would pose both environmental and nuisance-like problems). 
 62. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 831; see also Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 
706, 707-08 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 63. Rodgers, supra note 38, at 831. Some argue that settlement only occurred because 
of the unequal bargaining power between the government and the tribes and the political 
pressures surrounding the issue. Barnum, supra note 39, at 1169. 
 64. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-35 (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-14 (2005 
& Supp. 2012).  
 65. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 708.   
 66. Id. 
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a greater degree than most states exercise over their Indian tribes.”67 In 
1980, both state and federal legislation were approved to rectify the 
agreement. The federal legislation is known as the Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement Act (Settlement Act),68 and the Maine statute is commonly 
referred to as the Implementing Act.69  
C. The Settlement Act 
The Settlement Act creates a relationship between the state of Maine 
and the tribes that is unique relative to other tribes throughout the United 
States.70 The Act’s established purpose is to provide a settlement to the 
Maine Indian’s claims that is both “fair and just.”71 It gives over one 
hundred thousand acres of land to each of the Southern Tribes to be held 
in trust by the United States.72 As part of the settlement, the tribes were 
officially federally recognized but were still bound by the laws that apply 
generally to all Indian lands.73 However, the Settlement Act follows the 
Implementing Act in so far as it does not affect Maine’s ability to govern 
the Indian tribes; it merely ratified that Maine had certain authority over 
the tribes.74 The Act only allows the State of Maine to amend the 
jurisdictional powers of the Penobscot Nation if the Nation agrees to 
such an amendment.75 The language of both acts is remarkably vague, 
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has previously required Congress 
be exceptionally clear when it “seeks to authorize state jurisdictional and 
regulatory authority over Indian tribes.”76 Additionally, courts generally 
give great deference to the sovereignty of Native American tribes 
                                                     
 67. Id.; see Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 484-85 (1st Cir. 1997).  
 68. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-35. 
 69. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6201-14. 
 70. Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, ¶ 12, 770 A.2d 574; see 
also Malumphy & Yates, supra note 38, at 266; 25 U.S.C. § 1725(h) (exempting Maine 
and the tribes from any future federal legislation regulating other Indian tribes). The 
Settlement Act, unlike the Implementing Act, includes reference a wider range of Maine 
Indian tribes, like the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians. See Aroostook Band of 
Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2007). Some of these tribes negotiated 
separate settlements with Maine, solidified through alternative legislation. See id. 
 71. 25 U.S.C. § 1721(a)(7). 
 72. Id. at § 1724(d). 
 73. Id. at § 1725(h).  
 74. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1997); 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1721(b)(3), (4) (2). 
 75. 25 U.S.C. § 1725(e)(1). 
 76. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 195 n.5 
(1999); Barnum, supra note 39, at 1169 & n.52; cf. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 
376 (1976). 
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because of traditional federal policies of “tribal independence”77 and the 
“unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.”78 
The Implementing Act was incorporated into the federal statute,79 as 
Congress retains plenary power to legislate Indian affairs, and “only 
Congress can abrogate or limit an Indian Tribe’s sovereignty.”80 The 
incorporation of the state law without the Settlement Act was an attempt 
by Congress at balancing the interests of Maine, including regulation 
within its borders, with the “inherent authority of the tribe[s] to self-
govern.”81 In fact, according to the legislative history of the federal 
statute, Congress intended for the tribes to gain sovereignty that had been 
taken from them through early American history.82 Both houses of 
Congress assured the tribes they would retain some sovereignty, 
specifically ensuring that the tribes would “henceforth . . . be free from 
state interference in the exercise of their internal affairs.”83  
D. The Implementing Act 
The Implementing Act generally states that the tribes, specifically 
the Southern Tribes, are subject to the laws of Maine, subject to certain 
narrow exceptions.84 The Southern Tribes, within their reservations, are 
subject to Maine law, “provided . . . that internal tribal matters, including 
membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within 
the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, 
tribal elections, and the use . . . of settlement fund income shall not be 
                                                     
 77. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980).  
 78. Cnty of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) 
(“[A]mbiguous provisions [should be] interpreted to [the tribe’s] benefit”); accord Rhode 
Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 702 (1st Cir. 1994) (using a specific 
rule of statutory construction that requires interpreting strictly laws interfering with 
Indian rights). 
 79. 25 U.S.C. § 1721(b)(3) (2006); see also Akins, 130 F.3d at 484.  
 80. Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 709 (1st Cir. 1999); see U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 8, c1. 3; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-53 (1974). Even the 
passage of time is not seen as a reason to allow states to abrogate traditional tribal rights 
to self-governance. See also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231 (1982 
ed.).  
 81. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 29 (1980) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 56 (1978)). 
 82. Cf. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 14 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 14-15 (1980). 
 83. S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 14 (1980); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1353, at 14-15 (1980); 
Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1999).  
 84. Akins, 130 F.3d at 484-85 (“As to state law, the Penobscot Nation and Maine 
expressly agreed that, with very limited exceptions, the Nation is subject to the laws of 
Maine.”).  
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subject to regulation by the State.”85 Thus, each tribe usually functions as 
a municipality, subject to the laws of Maine; but with regard to internal 
matters, each tribe functions as a sovereign entity.86 
E. The Internal Tribal Matter Standard 
In determining whether or not a certain action is an internal tribal 
matter, the court must examine each issue on a case-by-case basis.87 
Courts have developed a five-factor test to determine if an action is an 
“internal tribal matter.” First, it is essential to resolve whether “the 
disputed policy regulate[s] only tribal members.”88 Second, the policy 
must relate to “lands acquired by the Nation with federal funds received 
for that purpose, and the lands were considered [Indian territory].”89 
Additionally, a contributing factor is whether “the policy affect[s] the 
Nation’s ability to regulate its natural resources.”90 Furthermore, the 
policy “at least on its face . . . [does] not implicate or impair the 
interest[s] of the State of Maine.”91 Finally, the activity must involve “an 
‘internal tribal matter’ consistent with prior legal understandings.”92 The 
First Circuit added a sixth factor that looks to the statutory origins of the 
activity or regulation at issue.93 Although the Akins test is not a binding 
determination of whether a specific action is considered an “internal 
tribal matter,” it does offer guidance in determining applicable 
regulations and statutes.94 However, because Akins is not binding, it 
remains open to interpretation and is essentially a balancing test.95 
                                                     
 85. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(1) (2005).  
 86. Akins, 130 F.3d at 485. 
 87. Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, ¶ 21 n.6, 962 A.2d 944.    
 88. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709; Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-87. 
 89. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709; Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-487. 
 90. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709; Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-487. 
 91. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709; Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-487. 
 92. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709; Akins, 130 F.3d at 486-487. 
 93. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 712-13. 
 94. Id. at 709. 
 95. Opinion of the Department of Interior on the Effect of Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement Act on State of Maine’s Application to Administer National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program, Office of the Solicitor (May 16, 
2000), available at 
http://www.penobscotnation.org/dnr/Water/Legal%20Resources/Legal%20Documents/D
epartment%20of%20Interior%20Opinions%20to%20the%20U.S.%20Environmental%20
Protection%20Agency/19717.pdf (finding that a balancing test was necessary and that the 
interests of the tribe in regulating the water quality of its water sources was more 
important than the adverse impact that it could have on non-tribal individuals and the 
state at large). 
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It has been established that the list of internal tribal matters within 
the Implementing Act is not an exhaustive list but merely illustrative of 
the types of matters which the tribes, and not the state, have authority to 
control.96 “Internal tribal matters” does not have the same meaning as 
“internal and social relations,” “internal affairs,” or “tribal self-
government.”97 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, used 
the statutory interpretation method of ejusdem generis in determining 
that the examples in the Implementing Act, while not exclusive, only 
included matters that are similar to those listed.98 The Law Court opined 
that “internal tribal matters,” at the time of the implementation of the 
Settlement Act, protected the tribes’ “unique cultural or historical 
interest[s].”99 In Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, the Law Court determined 
that illegal beano games, the profits of which were used to fund the tribe, 
were not “internal tribal matters” because allowing this form of illegal 
activity “would make a myriad of other forbidden or . . . criminal 
practices legal so long as they turned a profit for the Nation.”100 Because 
beano was not considered unique to the Indian character, or to their 
historical or cultural interests, beano was not determined to be an internal 
tribal matter.101 However, beano is distinct from those cases in which 
taxes have been upheld, because beano is only an internal tribal matter 
based on the future uses of the revenue, whereas the imposition of a tax 
is a direct action by the government.102 The court attempted to generally 
define an internal tribal matter as something that is Indian in character, is 
traditional Indian practice, or is “of a particular cultural importance.”103 
The running of a beano game by the Penobscot Nation was not in 
violation of the law solely because “that organization is not shown to 
have inflicted upon the public an evil that the law seeks generally to 
prevent.”104 However, because beano was not a traditional “internal tribal 
                                                     
 96. Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, ¶ 13, 962 A.2d 944; see also Akins, 
130 F.3d at 486; Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 489 (Me. 1983). 
 97. Id. (distinguishing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (“internal 
and social relations”), Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959) (“internal affairs”), and 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973) (“tribal self-
government”)).  
 98. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 489 (Me. 1983). 
 99. Id. at 490 (citing S. Rep. No. 96-957).  
 100. Id. at 489.  
 101. Id. at 490.  
 102. Id. at 486 (interpreting the holding of Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 137 (1982) to narrowly determine the meaning of “internal tribal matter”).  
 103. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 490.  
 104. Id. at 487.  
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matter” and did not serve any particular cultural purpose, it was unlawful 
for the beano game to continue, despite the fact that there may not have 
been a measurable public harm.105 
F. Maine v. Johnson 
Although the Penobscot Nation, and by analogy, the Passamaquoddy 
Tribe, were to be treated as municipalities, their status as such was not 
enough to override a statewide scheme of regulation that attempted to 
control discharge into certain waterways.106 The potential regulation at 
issue in Maine v. Johnson would have required a state-issued permit to 
discharge certain substances into specific navigable waterways, including 
those discharges occurring within Indian territories.107 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowed for the regulation of 
nineteen non-tribal facilities, but it did not allow the State to regulate two 
facilities located entirely on tribal land.108  
Both parties sought judicial review, arguing that the EPA had 
incorrectly applied the Settlement Act to the regulations at issue.109 The 
Southern Tribes sought judicial review of the EPA decision, arguing that 
the Southern Tribes retained full authority to control the actions and 
effects that occurred on their land involving non-tribal individuals.110 The 
tribes sought to prevent other producing entities from discharging 
pollution into waters that ran through the tribes’ reservations, claiming 
that the State had no more than concurrent authority with the tribes to 
regulate their waterways.111 The State argued that the EPA has rightfully 
determined that the non-tribal facilities could discharge into the river but 
“contend[ed] that the EPA erred in exempting the two tribal-owned 
facilities from the state[’s] permitting program.”112  
The court held that Maine retained authority to regulate discharging 
facilities because the state generally had authority to regulate land and 
                                                     
 105. Id. at 486.  
 106. Maine v. Johnson, 498 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Walstad, supra note 
47, at 498 (describing how the Johnson case moved directly from the EPA decision to 
review by the First Circuit Court of Appeals).  
 107. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 39-40.  
 108. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 40; see also Malumphy & Yates, supra note 38, at 264. 
 109. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 41.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 43 & n.6 (explaining that the Southern Tribes sought authority by showing 
that 25 U.S.C. § 1727(f) and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(3) provide certain 
“exclusive rights” to the state, and those rights not included are subject to state authority 
concurrent with the Tribe’s rights). 
 112. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 41.  
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waterways within tribal lands.113 The court rejected the Tribe’s argument 
that concurrent jurisdiction existed.114 Further, the court asserted that, 
although concurrent jurisdiction did not exist, the Tribes’ jurisdiction 
would have been superseded by the states if it had.115 The First Circuit 
distinguished Johnson from precedent, stating that in previous cases, the 
State of Maine had “disclaimed any interest in regulation or 
superintendence.”116 The court opined that the discharging of certain 
pollutants into waters that happened to run through Indian territory is not 
of the same character as those examples listed in the Implementing Act, 
such as tribal elections, membership, or government.117 Because of this 
distinction, the State had the ability to regulate both the discharging 
entities within the tribal territory and those producers outside of tribal 
land.118 
It has also been concluded that the Passamaquoddy Tribe retained no 
historical saltwater fishing rights after the enactment of the Settlement 
Act, and thus “internal tribal matters” did not include marine fishing 
rights.119 Although it has been determined that all regulation of natural 
resources is not an “internal tribal matter,”120 this generalization is 
incorrect. The regulation of natural resources that occurs solely within 
the tribal territory can potentially be considered an internal tribal 
matter.121 
                                                     
 113. Id. at 43. But see Walstad, supra note 47, at 505 (arguing that the court applied the 
canon of noscitur a sociis, a canon which is often confused with ejusdem generis because 
of their similar meaning and application). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 45 (distinguishing Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 
1997) and Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 710-11 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 117. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 46. The court went so far as to state that the language of the 
statutes was so unambiguous that a balancing test, as described in Akin and Fellencer, 
was not necessary. See id.; Akins, 130 F.3d at 488; Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 710-11. 
 118. Johnson, 498 F.3d at 46. 
 119. Op. Me. Att’y Gen. 13-01. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Akins, 130 F.3d at 490 (upholding a tribal regulation on a tribal members’ ability 
to harvest timber from tribal land); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) (giving wide-ranging power to tribes when the dispute is 
between tribe and a tribal member); but see Johnson, 498 F.3d at 46 (holding that the 
state could regulate discharge of pollutants into tribal waterways because the waterways 
were not “internal tribal matters.”).  
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G. Tribal Fishing Rights 
Tribal members have generally been allowed to fish for their own 
sustenance, provided that they do so with a valid sustenance license 
issued by the tribe, band, or nation.122 A fish is defined as “a cold 
blooded completely aquatic vertebrate animal having permanent fins, 
gills, and an elongated streamlined body usually covered with scales and 
includes inland fish and anadromous and catadromous fish when in 
inland water,”123 or more generally, “all finfish, squid and shrimp, or 
other marine animal, except lobsters, crabs, shellfish, scallops and 
marine worms.”124 The latter, more general, definition seems to include 
American eels. Sustenance is defined as “all noncommercial 
consumption or noncommercial use by any person within. . . [tribal 
lands] or at any location within the State by a tribal member, by a tribal 
member’s immediate family or within a tribal member’s household.”125 
Sustenance is not intended to include the selling of marine life.126 Only 
those individuals who hold a sustenance license are exempted from 
certain generally applicable fishing laws and regulations.127 Individuals 
who hold sustenance licenses are required to obey laws that apply to 
parties with state-issued licenses.128 The only exceptions to this 
requirement are that tribal members with valid sustenance licenses may 
fish out of season, except for when fishing for sea urchins, and 
sustenance permit holders are not required to pay equipment or “gear” 
fees.129 Sustenance fishing is only applicable to certain waterways that 
are located within the boundaries of the reservation; sustenance fishing 
within the bounds of the reservation seems plenary and is not limited by 
state law.130 Sustenance fishing only includes those ponds that are 
entirely within the boundaries of the reservation; otherwise, the 
Commission has authority to regulate ponds that are not entirely within 
                                                     
 122. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(2) (Supp. 2012). The term Passamaquoddy 
translates to “those of the place where the pollock are plentiful.” Walstad, supra note 47, 
at 488 (defining the term and stating that this translation lends support to the claim that 
fishing and marine regulation are essential to Passamaquoddy tribal members). 
 123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6207(9) (2005).  
 124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(16) (2012). 
 125. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(2) (Supp. 2012). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. 
 130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6207(4) (2005); see Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 
130 F.3d 482, 490 (1st Cir. 1997) (allowing tribes to regulate the resources within the 
bounds of the tribal land).  
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the reservation.131 Additionally, the Commission may regulate rivers, 
regardless of whether or not both sides of the river are within the 
reservation.132  
There have been questions about whether or not the Penobscot 
Nation has the ability to regulate the Penobscot River that surrounds its 
reservation.133 The outcome of such a determination could have far-
reaching consequences, for the tribes because of an inability to regulate 
the river, or for local businesses and municipalities that must change 
their practices to comply with tribal regulations.134 
V. THE REGULATION OF MAINE’S GLASS EEL FISHERIES 
The harvesting of American eels is controlled by the Atlantic States 
Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC), which is a compact between 
the fifteen Atlantic states that coordinates conservation within shared 
waters.135 The Stock Assessment Subcommittee, a branch of the ASMFC, 
found that poaching, or unlicensed fishing, was a “serious concern.”136 
Because of the recent increase in elver harvesting, Maine’s government 
has grown increasingly concerned about the durability and longevity of 
the elver fishery.137  
                                                     
 131. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6207(3) (2005). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Penobscot Nation v. Mills, No. 1:12-cv-254-GZS, 2013 WL 3098042, at *3 (D. 
Me. June 18, 2013). 
 134. Mario Moretto, Penobscot Nation Lawsuit Could Have Broad Effects for River 
Communities, Businesses, Says Attorney, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2012/09/18/news/hancock/penobscot-nation-lawsuit-could-
have-broad-effects-for-river-communities-businesses-says-attorney/?ref=inline 
[hereinafter Penobscot Nation Lawsuit]. 
 135. Press Release, Dep’t of Marine Res., Department of Marine Resources Responds 
to Misinformation Regarding Elver Fishery and Passamaquoddy Tribe (April 2, 2013), 
available at www.maine.gov/dmr/rm/eelelver/MaineElverMisinformation.htm. 
 136. ATL. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM’N, AMERICAN EEL BENCHMARK 
ASSESSMENT: TERMS OF REFERENCE & ADVISORY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN EEL STOCK 
ASSESSMENT PEER REVIEW (2012), [hereinafter ADVISORY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN EEL 
STOCK ASSESSMENT] available at 
http://www.asmfc.org/uploads/file/americanEelBenchmarkStockAssessmentReport_May
2012.pdf.  
 137. Mario Moretto, Tribe Says LePage Threatened Passamaquoddy Over Elvers 
During ‘Enraged’ Phone Call, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/04/02/politics/tribe-says-lepage-threatened-
passamaquoddy-over-elvers-during-enraged-phone-call/?ref=relatedBox [hereinafter 
‘Enraged’ Phone Call]. 
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Maine’s elver fishing industry is one in which the regulations and 
governing laws are constantly changing, varying from year to year.138 
The Department of Marine Resources (DMR) is the department allocated 
to establish and enforce elver-fishing licenses and is required by statute 
to remain informed of the Maine Native American tribes’ elver fishing 
activities.139 
Maine defines an elver as “a member of the species Anguila rostrata 
in that stage of its life cycle when it is less than 6 inches in length.”140 
This could be read in two distinct ways, each of which has a profound 
effect on the type of fishing that can occur. One interpretation could read 
“that stage” to imply the “elver” stage of life, which occurs between the 
glass eel and yellow eel stages. This reading is likely incorrect, however, 
as elvers range in size and a change in size, from smaller than 6 inches 
long to greater than 6 inches and does not alone allow for the 
determination that an American eel is no longer an elver. The more likely 
reading is that all American eels below 6 inches long are considered 
elvers under Maine law.141 By omission of a definition of American eel 
stages that occur before the “elver” stage, one can assume that “elver” is 
a generic term for a small American eel.142 
Elver fishing in Maine is regulated by a myriad of specific statutes, 
ranging from the method of performing the “elver lottery” to the types of 
nets with which one can fish for elvers.143 The elver season spans from 
noon on March 22nd to noon on May 31st.144 A person may not fish for 
elvers between noon on a Tuesday and noon on a Wednesday and noon 
on a Saturday until noon on a Sunday, although said person may leave 
nets in the water if it is in a “condition that prevents the capture of 
elvers.”145 
Four different types of elver fishing licenses are permitted in Maine, 
including a resident license for use of one device, a resident license for 
                                                     
 138. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6505-A(2-A) (2005) (repealed 2006); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 6302-A, amended by Pub. L. No. 301-451, ch. 8, § 2 (2013) 
(emergency, effective March 21, 2013) (repealing, in part, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
6505-A(2-B) (2005 & Supp. 2012)).  
 139. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(3) (2013).  
 140. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6001(13-F) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (defining words such as “elver” and “eel,” while omitting language defining 
“glass eels”).  
 143. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 6505-A(2-B) (2013), amended by P.L. 
2013, ch. 8, § 2 (emergency, effective March 21, 2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
6575-B(2-B) (2005 & Supp. 2012).  
 144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6575(1).. 
 145. Id. § 6575-A.  
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the use of two devices, a non-resident license for the use of one device, 
and a non-resident license for the use of two devices.146 The law allows 
for the use of dip nets, eel traps, and fyke nets to fish elvers.147 Violation 
of the fishing season, net type, or licensing requirements is considered a 
strict liability Class D crime and is punishable by a mandatory $2,000 
fine, of which none may be suspended.148. The DMR Commissioner has 
traditionally had the ability to award elver licenses via a lottery, held on 
February 15th of each year, by which a person may either gain a license 
or the ability to use certain gear when fishing.149 A person may not sell 
elvers, except to a person that has a valid elver dealer’s license, and the 
transaction must be in a form by which both the seller and buyer are 
named, or with a receipt that contains the names of both parties.150  
The Southern Tribes have consistently had the ability to issue, within 
their tribes or nations, licenses that grant the same rights as those licenses 
issued through the regular statutory channels, be it a lottery or other 
method.151 In 2013, statutory language placed a strict limit on the amount 
of elver fishing licenses the tribes, specifically the Southern Tribes, could 
distribute to their members. The Penobscot Nation is limited to granting 
eight commercial elver-fishing licenses per calendar year, unless the 
Commissioner believes that the elver fishery can support the issuance of 
additional licenses.152 The Passamaquoddy Tribe has a far more 
complicated system, by which the Tribe may issue 200 licenses, 
including the following: 124 single-piece (fyke or dip net) licenses; 26 
two-piece (fyke and dip nets) licenses; and 50 dip net licenses for fishing 
in the St. Croix River.153 
In late 2013 and early 2014, Maine began evaluating the process by 
which elvers are fished and by which elver licenses are granted.154 This 
evaluation was brought about because of pressure from the ASMFC and 
                                                     
 146. Id. § 6505-A(1)(A-D).  
 147. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6505-A(5) (2005 & Supp. 2012). 
 148. See id. at §§ 6505-A(8-A), 6575(5), 6575-A(2). 
 149. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6505-A(2-B), amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 8, § 2 
(emergency, effective Mar. 21, 2013).  
 150. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6575-H(1) (Supp. 2014).  
 151. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(1) (Supp. 2014). 
 152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(3)(E), amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 8, § 1 
(emergency, effective Mar. 21, 2013).  
 153. Id.; Bill Trotter, Passamaquoddys Issue Far More Elver Licenses Than Allowed 
by Law, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/03/29/news/hancock/passamaquoddys-issue-far-more-
elver-licenses-than-allowed-by-law/?ref=relatedBox [hereinafter Trotter, 
Passamaquoddys Issue Far More Licenses]. 
 154. Trotter, Reduce Lucrative Elver Landings, supra note 5.  
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the risk that the entire Maine elver fishery would have to be shut down 
unless significant changes were made to its regulation.155  
There were many proposals about how to achieve specific goals set 
by the ASMFC, which, in major part, required the DMR to reduce elver 
landings by twenty-five to forty percent.156 One proposal was to 
implement a statewide quota and introduce a ‘swipe’ card, which would 
track the amount of elvers sold to Maine dealers.157 The information 
obtained from the cards would be entered into a statewide database, 
which would ensure that the State does not exceed its set quota.158 The 
statewide quota would be 11,749 pounds and would take effect during 
the 2014 season.159 A second proposal, written as emergency legislation, 
was specifically oriented toward tribal elver fishing.160 Because of 
problems regarding the validity of licenses issued by the tribes, the Bill 
sought to clarify the process by which tribal licenses become effective161 
and the punishment for a violation of the aforementioned process.162 The 
Bill requires that tribal members with tribal licenses use swipe cards to 
track their catches  in order to ensure that each tribe’s quota is not 
exceeded.163 The Bill only refers to tribal members and does not impose 
such filing requirements on non-tribal members, a distinction which is 
likely based on the fact that non-tribal members would receive their 
                                                     
 155. Bill Trotter, State Considering Issuing ‘Swipe’ Cards for Elver Fishermen, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/11/13/business/state-considering-issuing-swipe-cards-
for-elver-fishermen/ [hereinafter Trotter, ‘Swipe’ Cards for Elver Fishermen] 
(emphasizing that the reduction was mandatory). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. Passamaquoddy had originally suggested that quota be implemented in order to 
better regulate the elver fishing industry. See also Harrison, supra note 28.  
 158. Trotter, ‘Swipe’ Cards for Elver Fishermen, supra note 155 (stating that the card 
system may also reduce the amount of elver poaching and illegal elver sales).  
 159. Press Release, Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n, Maine Implements First 
Ever Quota for Glass Eel Fishery (Feb. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.asmfc.org/uploads/file/52f52771pr05_MaineAmEelQuota.pdf [hereinafter 
ASMFC Press Release]. 
 160. See generally L.D. 1625, 126th Sess. (Me. 2014). This bill was eventually signed 
into law by Governor Paul LePage on March 18, 2014, and is codified within the Maine 
law. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-B (Supp. 2014).  
 161. Id. §§ 6302-B(1)-(2).  
 162. Id. § 6302-B(3). 
 163. L.D. 1625, 126th Sess. (Me. 2014). The law does, however, allow the 
commissioner to establish similar rules for non-tribal members. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, § 6505-A(3-A). 
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licenses directly from the DMR.164 The Bill’s sponsor suggested the bill 
was merely clarifying the law, in order to avoid confrontations similar to 
those that occurred during the 2013 elver fishing season.165 Other, less 
popular, suggestions were also put forth, including encouraging 
individuals to submit “photographs of license plates of people they 
believed were illegally harvesting . . . elvers.”166 Although its language 
was vague, the ASMFC accepted the DMR proposal that would 
implement a swipe card system and establish a statewide quota.167 The 
ASMFC stated that the proposal, specifically the quota, “should allow for 
increased management flexibility and conservation of the [elver 
fishery].”168  
VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE 2013 REGULATIONS ON TRIBAL MEMBERS 
The Passamaquoddy Tribe, prior to the opening of the 2013 elver-
fishing season, issued around 575 elver-fishing licenses to its members, 
which far exceeds the 200 licenses prescribed by emergency 
                                                     
 164. Bill Trotter, Bill Would Require Department of Marine Resources Approval for 
Tribal Elver Licenses, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2014), 
https://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/16/politics/bill-would-require-department-of-
marine-resources-approval-for-tribal-elver-licenses/ [hereinafter Trotter, Approval for 
Tribal Elver Licenses] (expressing the concerns of the Southern Tribes, namely that the 
law discriminates against Native Americans and imposes a harsh punishment on a 
community with high unemployment and very little employment opportunity).   
 165. Id. (“We’re not trying to single out any group, . . . [but] [w]e need to have a 
manageable fishery and we don’t have that right now.”). 
 166. Abigail Curtis, Elver Harvesters a ‘Renegade’ Fishery? Not This Year, Fishermen 
are Cautioned by State Officials, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/03/01/news/midcoast/elver-harvesters-a-renegade-
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‘Renegade’ Fishery]. 
 167. ASMFC Press Release, supra note 160 (“This quota . . . represents a 35% 
reduction from the 2013 Maine’s [sic] glass eel harvest.”). 
 168. Id. The new law specifically allows for six Passamaquoddy members to fish for 
elvers with fyke nets, while all other tribal members may receive a license to fish for 
elvers with dip nets. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A (3)(E-1) (2014), amended by 
P.L. 2014, ch. 485, § 2 (emergency, effective Mar. 18, 2014). A statewide quota was also 
implemented, which granted specific tribes a certain amount of the overall state quota. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-B(1) (2014), amended by P.L. 2014, ch. 485, § 3 
(emergency, effective Mar. 18, 2014). Non-tribal members have individual quotas, 
ranging from 7,566 to 9,688 pounds, depending on the type of license issued. 13-188 
C.M.R. ch. 32, § 35 (2014); see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6505-A(3-A) (2014), 
amended by P.L. 2014, ch. 485, § 7 (emergency, effective Mar. 18, 2014).  
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legislation.169 The DMR determined that in order to comply with the law, 
the first 150 licenses would be considered valid, with all licenses 
numbered above 151 being considered invalid.170 
The regulations, which make certain actions criminal, have a 
disproportionate effect on the tribal members, especially the 
Passamaquoddy.171 This effect may be caused by the confusing and 
scattered regulations regarding tribal elver licensing and the inability to 
determine if a license is valid or invalid.172Additionally, district attorneys 
and other legal officials who are involved in elver litigation remain 
unsure of the potential rights of tribal members and of how the 
Settlement and Implementing Acts interact with the elver fishing 
restrictions.173 The Tribe has claimed that fishing is part of the Tribe’s 
tradition and religion.174 
The Passamaquoddys were previously involved in negotiations with 
the DMR and the State to create legislation that would give the 
Passamaquoddys more authority over elver fishing within their 
boundaries.175 The tentative agreement involved the tribe capping its total 
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 174. Harrison, supra note 28.  
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elver catch at 1,650 pounds, and, in return, the State agreed to allow the 
tribe to issue as many elver licenses as it deemed necessary. 176 The tribal 
members would only be allowed to use dip nets, rather than larger fyke 
nets, to catch the elvers.177 However, before the agreement was 
formalized, the Maine Attorney General voiced concerns regarding the 
constitutionality of the proposal.178 The Attorney General believed the 
agreement would violate the Equal Protection Clause of Maine’s 
constitution, which would render it unenforceable.179 The Tribe argued 
that because of their sovereignty, as determined within the Settlement 
and Implementing Acts, they were rendered immune from equal 
protection claims.180  
VII. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW 
In order to evaluate the potential criminal liability of the tribal 
members, it is essential to determine if the laws apply to them.181 The 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court has held that it will not read a statute to 
conflict with another statute, if there is a reasonable alternative 
interpretation that allows for laws to coexist in harmony.182 There may 
still be a violation of the elver fishing laws, even if it is shown that the 
tribe did not substantially impact the elver fishery.183 
A court may give great deference to an agency’s interpretation of the 
legal authority which it has been granted, so long as the legislative 
history and statute are silent as to the issue at hand; otherwise, the 
legislative history and statute are indicative and potentially binding.184 
In this case, although the statute establishes which tribe, nation, or 
band will receive a certain number of licenses, it may not have been 
within the DMR’s jurisdiction to determine which of the 575 issued 
licenses were to be considered valid.  
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“Internal tribal matters” generally “include matters concerning 
‘action by the Nation directly affecting them’ and matters concerning 
‘the . . . [n]ation’s historical culture or development.’”185 To determine if 
elver fishing is an “internal tribal matter,” the five-factor test from Akins 
must be applied.186 First, does “the policy purport[] to regulate only 
members of the tribe”?187 The Passamaquoddy attempted to allow over 
500 of their members to commercially fish for elvers.188 The Tribe did 
not attempt to regulate non-tribal individuals and did not attempt to grant 
licenses to any individuals who were not tribal members.189 The Tribes 
have previously been able to regulate access to the timber on tribal land, 
by either granting or denying permits and setting the terms upon which 
such permits may be granted.190 Although the Tribe issued more licenses 
than the State claimed it had the ability to grant, the licenses only directly 
impacted the members of the tribe.191 This intra-tribal regulation is not 
dissimilar to the regulation of timber within the tribal lands.192 Although 
the elver fishery is potentially more lucrative than the timber industry, 
the factors, as stated by the First Circuit, only give weight to the impact 
of elver fishing on non-tribal members.193 Although the tribal members 
collect enough elvers to garner a significant profit, the impact of their 
activities is minimal compared to that of non-tribal individuals.194 Tribal 
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members brought in over 1,600 pounds of elvers.195 However, when 
compared to the general catch in Maine, 1,600 pounds is merely 10%.196 
From the quantity of elvers obtained by each group, it seems that non-
tribal members have a far more significant impact on the fishery than 
their tribal counterparts. The fact that a tribal action only has a cursory 
effect on non-tribal members or only affects a small number of non-tribal 
members is a relevant factor.197  
Relatedly, the attempted regulation of tribal elver fishing “has to do 
with the commercial use of lands acquired by the [tribes] with the federal 
funds [they] received for [that] purpose as part of the settlement 
agreement.”198 Assuming that Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy 
Tribe members only attempt to collect elvers within their individual 
tribal areas, it is likely that this prong of the Akins test is satisfied. In 
Akins, the court concluded that since the timber was only harvested from 
lands owned by the Penobscot Tribe, that timber regulation was an 
internal tribal matter.199 Similarly, the Southern Tribes, if successful, 
would likely only have the ability to collect elvers within the bounds of 
their tribal lands. Otherwise, there would likely be an impact on the 
ability of non-tribal members to fish for elvers, which would weigh 
against the Southern Tribes in an evaluation of the Akins factors, 
specifically the first prong.200 
Third, it must be determined whether the policy affects the tribe, 
nation, or band’s ability to control its natural resources.201 Elvers are, by 
all accounts, a natural resource, regardless of the argument regarding 
what entity has the ability to regulate them.202 There are diverse 
outcomes when evaluating this factor of the Akins test. Many courts have 
previously allowed tribes to regulate resources within their boundaries, 
while others have determined the State retains the ability to regulate 
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other resources.203 Even when natural resources were not involved, courts 
have determined that tribes retain the ability to perform certain actions 
that are in their best interest.204 This prong of the Akins test is likely 
satisfied and weighs in favor of the tribe because elvers are a natural 
resource which is within the tribal lands and one which the State is 
attempting to regulate.205 Because of the heavy deference granted to the 
tribal sovereignty, this prong seemingly weighs in favor of the tribes, 
which have for hundreds of years fished and hunted on their tribal 
lands.206 This traditional activity, in the spirit of the Akins test, seems to 
be an “internal tribal matter.”207  
Fourth, a court would likely evaluate whether the policy of the tribe 
or other entity implicates or impairs the interests of the State of Maine.208 
This is potentially the most problematic section of the Akins test for the 
Southern Tribes. Maine has established numerous regulations regarding 
the harvest and sale of elvers, with the laws changing annually.209 In prior 
cases, despite the fact that the Tribes have been permitted to regulate 
particular natural resources that exist on their tribal lands, the State was 
not attempting to regulate the same resource.210 Although the 
interpretation of both the Settlement and Implementing Acts are to break 
in favor of the Indians if ambiguities exist, it has not always been the 
case that the statute has been determined to be ambiguous.211 The 
language of the Settlement Act includes an exemption for State law 
“relating to land use or environmental matters.”212 In resolving whether 
or not the State could regulate pollution discharge into waterways that 
travelled through tribal lands, the EPA determined that the state retained 
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authority to promulgate environmental regulation because the clause in 
the Settlement Act would be rendered redundant if it did not provide for 
any actual exception.213 In the past, courts have determined that certain 
areas of natural resource regulation are not internal tribal matters, for 
example “the regulation of water quality within the state is a matter of 
the legitimate interest of the citizens of [the] state.”214 Although the 
harvesting of elvers has an impact on the general population of Maine, 
such effects are not as far-reaching as the regulation of freshwater within 
the state. This factor weighs heavily in favor of the State because of the 
specific language of the Settlement and Implementing Acts.  
Lastly, it is essential to determine whether the tribal licensing and 
sanctioning of tribal members’ ability to fish is consistent with prior 
legal understandings of what constitutes an “internal tribal matter.”215 
First, the harvesting of elvers for subsistence by tribal members may not 
be acceptable under Maine law because an elver may not meet the 
definition of a “fish.”216 The two State and federal statutes do not grant 
complete sovereignty to the tribes.217 The EPA previously determined 
that because the State had exercised jurisdiction over certain aspects of 
the tribe, total sovereignty was not granted by either of the statutes.218 
Because the Indians had not retained total control over their lands and 
resources, “internal tribal matters” must have had a separate meaning 
that would include any activity in which the tribe could be involved.219 
This is a more limited definition of “internal tribal matter,” one that does 
not generally include the right of a tribe to total self-governance.220 
Although the statutory list is not exhaustive, it is indicative of the type of 
actions that may be undertaken by the tribes without State 
involvement.221 Many cases have evaluated “internal tribal matters” in 
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terms of the traditional and non-traditional roles of the tribes. The First 
Circuit determined that the Tribe’s ability to determine its best interests 
in health care and to restrict harvesting of timber on tribal lands were 
both examples of “internal tribal matters” which fit within the traditional 
roles of the tribes.222 However, Stilphen involved a type of activity that 
was not traditionally performed by members of the various tribes and 
nations.223 The fact that the Southern Tribes have, for centuries, fished 
within the waters of their respective lands suggests that the practice is 
essential to the cultural and historical character of their members.224 
Additionally, the regulation the tribe seeks to enforce only concerns 
tribal members and, thus, the tribe may retain general authority over 
actions within its bounds.225 The ability of the Tribes to regulate fishing 
within their waterways remains consistent with prior legal interpretations 
of “internal tribal matters,” as it is a traditional activity that only involves 
tribal members.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The rights of Maine’s Indian tribes may not guarantee their ability to 
harvest elvers, when a state law, applicable to all citizens, has been 
established to inhibit their ability. However, these tribes may be able to 
overcome certain regulations that prohibit the fishing of elvers and other 
stages of the American eel’s life cycle. If the tribes are successful in 
proving that elver fishing is a traditional practice of their culture, then 
they may be able to continue to fish for elvers in order to provide 
sustenance and cultural certainty to their tribes. Despite the wide range of 
this exception, it would likely only apply on the reservations, to tribal 
members. It is unlikely that the tribes would receive a blanket exemption 
from the law. Because the elver fisheries have been steadily declining 
due to many factors such as over-fishing, the Indians would likely not be 
able to fish in all rivers, ponds, and other waterways for the high-priced 
organisms. These exemptions, although possible, are not likely to be 
implemented. Although the fishing may be an “internal tribal matter,” the 
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state could still retain authority to regulate it because of the effect that it 
has on the general sustainability of the Maine elver fishery. The most 
recent laws, enacted in 2014, attempted to clarify the status of tribal 
members within the wider elver fishing regulatory environment. These 
laws granted the tribes far more autonomy than they had in earlier 
seasons, namely 2013. However, the laws may not recognize the inherent 
sovereignty of Maine’s tribes to continue to function in a traditional 
manner. Although tensions have partially subsided, the ever-changing 
landscape of elver regulation could cause friction at any time. The 
question of sovereignty of the tribes to fish is entirely dependent on the 
application of precedent and the extent to which elvers are considered a 
traditional cultural practice of the Southern Tribes. Until a court is faced 
with an issue of tribal sovereignty and considers its relationship with 
Maine’s fishing regulations, the rights of the tribes hang in the balance, 
and tribal members are left to individually determine whether their 
actions are permitted or prohibited by law, a task that is far more difficult 
than it may initially appear.  
 
 
